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The Future of Mexican-U.S. Economic Relations: 
Is the EU a Model for North America? 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In the last few years some analysts and observers of North American integration  in 
Mexico but also in the Unites States,  have been proposing the need for a deepening of 
North American trade and investment liberalization toward higher levels of integration 
covering social and immigration policies. In these proposals normally one finds 
references to the European Union (EU) as a model of integration that North America 
should follow.
1 
 
In this paper I will address two questions. First, to what extent is the EU a useful 
model for the near future integration efforts in the North American region. Second, what 
is the likely future evolution of North American integration?  In order to answer these 
two  questions, first,  I will compare the experiences of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the EU and  will try to demonstrate that although NAFTA and 
the EU share important commonalities in terms of extent and depth of integration, they  
are also very different  in terms of origins, goals, scope, degree of institutionalization and 
centralization and because of this, one important lesson one can draw from the EU 
experience is that higher convergence in the social  field is not likely at least in the short 
term in North America. However, in the second part of the paper, I will argue that 
September 11
th opens in my opinion a possibility to advance the process of integration in 
the trade and migration fronts. In order for this to happen a Schengen type of agreement 
would have to be negotiated between Mexico and the United States. 
 
 
Economic and Political Models which account for Processes of Integration 
 
Economists as well as political scientists have formulated models useful to understand 
processes of integration. These models normally entail categories that try to account for 
the nature and extent of integration, both economic, social and political. For instance, in 
economics there is  a  model  which is normally used to account for regional processes of 
integration which departs from the assumption that integration can be explained on the 
basis of a continuum which starts from a basic "negative" form of integration, (which 
entails the removal of discrimination and of restrictions on the free movement of goods 
and factors of production between countries), and a more advanced "positive" form, 
which requires the development of common institutions and policies to enable the 
integrated market to function effectively and to promote collective political and economic 
objectives.
2 Bela Balassa's classic model, for instance, formulates economic integration 
                                                           
1 A clear example of this approach is found in Robert Pastor´s book Toward a North American 
Community? (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000). 
2  Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration. (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 1.   2
as a process in which three cumulative stages of negative or market integration (free trade 
area, customs union, and common market) are superseded by two stages of positive or 
policy integration (economic union and total economic integration).
3  In principle, each 
stage incorporates all features of the preceeding one, plus a new element. 
 
  From this perspective, we can situate integration arrangements like the Asian-
Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), or the former European Free Trade Area 
(EFTA) and go through arrangements like NAFTA, the Southern cone Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), and reach the EU which from this perspective, is the most advanced 
example of deep positive integration.  
 
  Political scientists, like Peter Smith from the University of San Diego, have also 
proposed models, aimed at comparing integration arrangements according to dimensions 
of  scope, depth, institutionalization, and centralization.
4 The advantages of these 
categories are that they account not only for the extent of economic integration but also 
for the level of political, social and legal integration among countries.   
 
What one realizes when applying these categories is that among all integration 
arrangements existing at the present time throughout the world, the EU is the most 
ambitious and complete undertaking.  The EU covers a broader range of economic, 
political and social issues, involves deeper policy coordination, is more institutionalized 
and has resulted in more centralized decision-making. But where in this continuum can 
we place North American integration? In order to answer this question, we will use 
Smith’s categories of depth, scope, institutionalization and centralization. 
 
The European Union and NAFTA compared 
 
When one reviews the process of integration that is taking place in North America using 
the variable of scope,  one has to recognize  that  the three countries of North American 
do enjoy a relationship nearly as wide as those of the EU countries. The NAFTA is 
clearly a result of a long-term trend towards integration of trade and investment in the 
North American economy. More than 80 percent of Mexican and Canadian trade is with 
the United States and between 33 and 35 of United States trade is with Canada and 
Mexico. Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States while Mexico in 2004 
was the third largest. There are also substantial U.S. Mexican and U.S. Canadian foreign 
investment flows. Labor market integration between the Mexican and the US economies 
is also very high. Mexican migrant labor has had a large impact on the US economy by 
increasing the labor supply an effect probably greater that that arising from increased 
                                                           
3 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (London: Allen and Unwin, 1962). 
4 Peter Smith, “The Politics of Integration: Concepts and Themes” in The Challenge of Integration. 
Europe and the Americas ed. Peter H. Smith (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers 1993),  
5 and ff. Scope is defined as the range of issues  and transactions falling under the purview of the 
integration scheme; Depth as the extent of policy coordination or harmonization; Institutionalization as the 
degree to which accommodation and decision making take place in organized and predictable ways; and 
centralization the extent to which there exists a central supranational decision-making apparatus to 
establish common policy.   3
U.S.- Mexican commodity trade, direct foreign investment, or financial transactions. At 
least 10 percent of the growth of the U.S. labor supply since world war two is due to 
Mexican migrants. Besides all of the above, NAFTA itself as a free trade agreement is 
without doubt  the most profound economic integration arrangement short of a common 
market.
5 But here is where similarities end between NAFTA and the EU. Despite the 
obvious affinities, the EU as a model provide for deeper integration than does NAFTA.  
 
The same explanatory variable of scope is extremely useful in highlighting the 
differences between the two arrangements. To begin with, the EU has had uniform 
custom policy since January 1, 1993. In fact, most if not all of the EU nations have 
already eliminated customs checkpoints along their borders. This, however, is not the 
case in North America where each country in NAFTA retains its own regulations and 
have not contemplated a common custom policy.  Next, the treaties governing the EU 
provide for the free movement of persons among member nations. Students and laborers 
are particularly attended to, with European youth eligible for up to a year of education at 
another country's national university and uniform labor protection laws covering the 
entire continent. In this dimension NAFTA is also much less ambitious since migration 
provisions only apply to professionals, business persons and investors all of whom have 
the right to transfer temporarily for work in member states. The Maastricht Treaty also 
covers trade policy (the Council of Ministers makes decisions applied to all members) , 
consumer protection, and defense none of which are addressed in the NAFTA agreement.  
 
Institutionalization as criteria for comparison points to further striking differences. 
The EU has implemented coordinated policies regarding: a)  trade agreements with non-
member nations (trade agreements are agreed to by the Union, not individual countries), 
b) macroeconomic policy (member states may not permit run-away  inflation nor 
unilaterally devalue their currencies), c) social security, d) tax legislation, e) health 
programs, f) competition and quality  issues, and consumer protection. NAFTA countries 
are free to pursue their own policies on all these issues. Furthermore, the EU has 
established a common currency, an  instrument which is not likely in the future in North 
America though it is only used for large inter-member transfers and each country 
continues to maintain its own legal tender. 
 
Considering the fact that both arrangements exist in the form of a diplomatic 
treaty, it may be unfair to say that one is more institutionalized than the other. 
Nonetheless, the EU allows decision making to take place in more organized and 
predictable ways than NAFTA does. For this reason, I would contend that NAFTA is not 
as formal an organization as the EU. This fact, notwithstanding, the very legal nature of 
both organizations provides for institutionalization far more thorough than APEC, the 
Andean Pact, with the exception of MERCOSUR. 
 
The argument for centralization is not as ambiguous. The EU clearly has a much 
more advanced central decision-making process: The European Commission draws up 
proposals that are binding on all members. No such body exists under the terms of 
                                                           
5 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, NAFTA an Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics 1994), 1.   4
NAFTA. In fact, changes to the treaty are negotiated on an ad-hoc basis. Dispute 
resolution does go to a central trade commission, but its decisions are not binding (though 
one country may retaliate against another that continues with policies that have been 
deemed unfair by a binational panel). The North American Free Trade Area also lacks 
institutions correlate to the European Council, Court of Justice or Court of Auditors. 
Another aspect of EU policymaking glaringly missing from NAFTA is the existence of a 
democratically-elected body to assist in its administration.   
 
Despite the similarities, it is clear, then, that the EU and NAFTA are two very 
different arrangements. Even when one steps away from Smith's explanatory variables 
the differences are clear. In NAFTA one country (the United States) is able to overpower 
the other two through pure economic might and a disparately large population. Such is 
not the case in Europe, where the largest country (Germany) contains less than a quarter 
of the group's people and earns less than 35 percent of its gross product. Further, the 
wage and GNP per capita disparities among EU nations (which measure about 3:1, 
Germany: Spain) are much smaller than those in NAFTA (where a 10:1 disparity exists 
between the United States and Mexico). 
 
The question then arises, why are the two arrangements so different? After all, 
both are integration schemes that involve western countries with a long tradition of 
market-based economic policy. One obvious explanation is that the EU is simply much 
older than NAFTA. Although founded in 1957, the EC did not even reach the point of 
free trade until 1968. If this is taken as a guide, it might be assumed that in thirty years 
the North American Continent will be as integrated as the European. 
 
This explanation only goes so far, however. The two treaties rose out of very 
different historical environments. It is perhaps foolish to assume a post-Cold War 
economic pact will develop in the same way one did that was founded during the 
Marshall Plan era. The differing surrounding elements do offer a compelling explanation, 
however. The needs of the European countries in the 1950's were markedly different 
from those of North America in the 1990s. Perhaps the most pressing reason for 
unification in the 1950s was the need to strengthen Western Europe to such an extent that 
it could resist a Soviet-led invasion. Clearly, North America faces no such threat today. 
Further, factories in post-World War II Europe needed to find economies of scale if they 
were to successfully rebuild. The productive plants of Canada, Mexico and the Unites 
States have not faced similar destruction since the Mexican Revolution in the 1920s.  
 
NAFTA was implemented for a unique set of reasons. To begin, with, Mexico 
was saddled with such high debt payments that it had no choice than to seek outside 
capital if it were to develop. It, therefore, sought a trade and investment agreement with 
the most powerful economy in the world. From a northern perspective, The United States 
wanted to help stabilize Mexico's economy in order to prevent the negative shocks that 
would transfer to the States of Texas and California if their southern neighbor were to 
continue experiencing economic and political difficulty. Canada simply wished to 
prevent the United States both from granting better trade and financial treatment to 
Mexico and from positioning itself as the only viable conduit to trade in the Americas.   5
This being the case, it is perhaps inappropriate to expect the EU and NAFTA to be 
overly similar. They grew out of different eras with different needs and for different 
reasons. In fact, in direct contravention of NAFTA, the EU has always been considered a 
political union first and an economic union second. The two treaties were never meant to 
be considered equal. 
 
Spill over in North America? 
 
There is a long standing debate in the literature about the political and economic impacts 
of economic integration in the countries involved. The question is whether once the 
process of integration is initiated at the lower level, there is a tendency to move more or 
less automatically from one stage to the next. Political theories of integration have often 
asserted such logic, while pure economic theory remains more skeptical.
6  Taking the EU 
example one could argue that indeed there is an inexorable logic to economic integration, 
even though the reactions of the Danish, French and English electorates  to deeper stages 
of integration clearly prove that the progress beyond the customs union is unlikely to be 
smooth. 
 
However, if one takes other examples like the free trade agreements forged on an 
individual basis between what at that time was the EC and members of the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Switzerland) 
one could reasonably argue that free trade areas can achieve stable equilibrium at levels 
that do not entail significant elements of supranationality, that is, that economic 
integration can be managed and contained at an early stage at least for a long time as the 
case of EFTA countries show. 
7 
 
In principle, it is clear that NAFTA countries have intentionally chosen the EFTA 
rather than the EU route, but what is the likelihood of the NAFTA following, albeit over 
some time the EU path of positive deepening integration? In my opinion, this will not 
happen for the near future. No country in North America would accept the erosion of 
sovereignty involved in the EU model.   
 
In clear contrast to the EU whose members have been willing to surrender their 
sovereignty in order to achieve common purposes, Mexico, Canada and the United States 
have guarded their sovereignty with great zeal. Mexico is extremely sensitive over key 
economic areas such as petroleum and over its autonomy in foreign affairs. Canada’s 
                                                           
6  Robson, 59-61. 
7 Victoria Curzon Price has aptly demonstrated that the free trade technique very successfully managed 
the relationship between the EC and the EFTA countries where these latter group of countries  “had no 
stomach for the highly intensive form of economic integration on which the EC was prepared to embark” 
and wanted “ to keep a free hand not only in trade policy but in ...industrial policy.” See her Free Trade 
Areas, The European experience. What Lessons for Canadian-US Trade Liberalization. Observation no. 31 
(Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1987). Of course, the recent adhesion of most of EFTA countries to the EU 
would seem to support the idea for the inexorable logic of economic integration. However, the fact that it 
took such a long time would support the notion that free trade areas can be contained  at least for a good 
number of years.    6
views are shaped by some of the same forces: cultural industries and water resources are 
to Ottawa what oil is to Mexico, while its sensitivity to autonomy in at least foreign 
economic policy is equally strong.
8  F o r  i n s t a n c e ,   b o t h  M e xico and Canada  have 
expressed opposition to an integration arrangement in the form of a customs union or a 
common market in the North American context because a  customs union or a common 
market require that a uniform set of trade and commercial policies be applied to all non-
members.  Mexico and Canada have given clear signs that they do not wish to follow 
U.S. initiatives on trade with the outside world.  Both countries have maintained trade 
relations with Cuba after the United States ceased to do so.
9 In other words, Canadian and 
Mexican strategic elites believe that if they are to preserve their autonomy in foreign 
economic policy, they cannot accept a common market’s legal restriction on its capacity 
for independent action.
10  
 
In the case of the United States, it is clear too that U.S. leaders are as unwilling to 
share or surrender sovereignty as its North American counterparts are. As an author has 
said: "The first impulse of great powers when faced with threats to the effectiveness of 
national policy is often to try to reinforce unilateral control by asserting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, as the United States has sought to do.”
11  There are many examples of this 
U.S. impulse like the October 1992 "Cuban Democracy Act" i.e.:   the Torricelly Law in 
the trade field, or the Helms Burton Law.  
 
A second important factor that will prevent NAFTA from following the pattern of 
Europe in the social field soon is the wide income disparities prevalent among the three 
NAFTA countries. These large income disparities would make the process of deepening 
integration very difficult and augment adjustment problems. As Hufbauer and Schott 
have pointed out, the European Community (EC) spanned a wide divide when it 
incorporated Spain and Portugal, countries whose per capita GNP levels at the time of 
accession (January 1986) were $4860 and $2,250, or 40 percent and 19 percent, 
respectively, of West German per capita GNP. By comparison, Mexico's per capita GNP 
was is in 2004 only 12 percent that of the United States and Canada combined.
12  
Moreover, there were fewer people to accommodate at the lower income levels in the EC 
case, thus limiting the adjustment burden and simplifying the task of paying for 
adjustment assistance.  
                                                           
8  The contrast between the United States and Canada is, of course, narrowed considerably by a shared  
Anglo-Saxon origin, similar economic level of development, a federal political structure, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) membership, and an alliance during two world wars. 
9 Let us remember that in the past Mexico also maintained trade and economic relations with 
Nicaragua during the Sandinista regime despite strong opposition from the United States.  
10 Mexico, for instance, has continued in the last few years to pursue trade initiatives with other 
regions. It has signed free trade agreements with 42 countries in Latin America, Europe, Asia and the 
Middle East.  Canada also has shown a strong interest in increasing its trade ties with other countries in 
Latin America and Europe. 
11 Robert Keohane, Sovereignty, Interdependence and International Institutions (Working Paper No. 1, 
Working Paper Series, Cambridge, Mass.: Centre for International Studies, 1991). 
12 Gary Hufbauer and Jeffrey Schott, North American Free Trade. Issues and Recommendations. 
(Washington, D.C. Institute for International Economics 1992), 7-8.     7
In consequence, if these important factors seem to preclude that NAFTA may in 
the near future follow the European pattern in terms of social integration, what is the 
likely future evolution of it? 
13 In order to answer this question, I think it is important to 
present a picture of what impact NAFTA has had for Mexico since it entered into force in 
January, 1994.  Is it achieving the purposes for which it was negotiated? Can the 
European experience offer any lessons to improve the integration process in North 
America? In the next section, I offer answers to these questions. 
 
Structural change in Mexico since the 1980s 
 
One way to appreciate the impact of NAFTA on the Mexican economy is by showing the 
strong process of structural change that the Mexican economy has experienced since the 
opening of the economy and especially since NAFTA went into effect. The following 
table shows the performance of the economy during successive periods, from the 
administration of President Miguel de la Madrid, who initiated the opening of the 
economy (1983-88). This was followed by President Salinas (1989-94), the crisis of 
1995, and the successful stabilization and growth during the period of President Ernesto 
Zedillo (1995-2000).  
 
                                                           
13  The difficulties present in North America to follow the EU route should not preclude the possibility 
that North American integration may take an unprecedented form in which elements of policy integration 
were instituted before lower levels of integration were complete. In fact, as we will argue in the following  
section,  September 11
th opened the door for this to happen in the migration field.   8
 
 
Macroeconomic overview 
 
The changes in the economy from before the NAFTA to after can be easily seen. 
Although Mexico suffered a devaluation and financial crisis in 1995, only one year after 
the NAFTA went into effect, this crisis was not caused by free trade. The high current 
account deficit, which reached $29.7 billion in 1994, or 6.8 percent of GDP, was caused 
by heavy overvaluation of the peso exchange rate, as the currency had been used since 
1989 as an anchor to bring inflation down. The NAFTA undoubtedly accelerated trade 
growth in 1994 and thus indirectly helped to precipitate the balance-of-payments crisis. 
But such a crisis would have occurred in any event, as the economy had accumulated 
considerable distortions from the overvalued peso. 
 
Free trade was, however, key for Mexico to recover quickly after 1995, as the 
table shows. With high import growth in 1994 having caused the external deficit to rise 
from -$23.4 billion to -$29.7 billion, when the peso adjusted down the deficit fell 
dramatically. There was unprecedented growth in exports, from $51.9 billion in 1993 to 
$166.4 billion in 2000, which helped overcome this crisis within a short period. The 
current account deficit fell to -$1.6 billion in 1995 and rose only to -$2.3 billion in 1996.  
 
Thus, for the first time in more than 30 years Mexico saw a reduction in the 
external current account deficit even in the presence of high import growth, which was on 
1983-88 1989-94 1995 1996-2000 2001
GDP (annual growth %)  1.1 3.9 -6.2 5.5 -0.3
GDP in manufacturing (annual growth %) 2.3 3.5 -4.8 6.4 -3.9
Manufacturing employment (annual growth %) 0.9 -1.2 -8.9 2.5 -4.3
Trade balance ($bn annual avge) 7.0 -12.2 7.1 -2.9 -9.9
Exports (annual growth %) 16.7 12.2 30.6 16.0 -4.8
Imports (annual growth %) 12.0 19.1 -8.7 19.3 -3.5
Manufactured exports ($bn annual avge) 7.3 33.3 66.6 109.7 141.3
Current account balance ($bn annual avge) 1.8 -10.7 -1.6 -11.6 -17.4
Foreign direct investment ($bn annual avge) 2.3 4.6 9.5 11.8 27.7
US GDP (annual growth %) 4.4 2.4 2.7 4.1 1.2
Foreign debt, end of period ($bn) 101.8 153.6 176.5 173.7 172.2
Source: INEGI, US Department of Commerce, and Ecanal
Table I
Economic Performance by Periods 1983-2001
($ million)  9
average 19.3 percent per year from 1996 to 2000. The current account deficit was only -
$11.6 billion on average and never exceeded -$18 billion, including in 2001, when 
exports to the United States fell -5 percent. The low current account deficit meant that the 
economy could grow faster than before without suffering balance-of-payments crises, as 
had been the case from the 1970s through 1994. 
 
Exports of goods and services jumped from 19.4 percent of GDP in 1985 to 32.8 
percent in 2000. Employment in manufacturing, not having grown for 15 years, grew 2.5 
percent per year, only interrupted in 2001 by the U.S. recession. Another significant 
change was that as Mexico became more integrated with North America, in 2001 its 
economy adjusted downwards following the U.S. recession, avoiding an expansion of 
domestic demand when exports were flat. 
 
Since 1995, Mexico has had a floating exchange rate, which became validated as 
the appropriate regime, for it allowed Mexico to adjust smoothly to external shocks from 
the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98. The floating exchange rate has been responsible 
for much of the success of Mexican exports and for the control of the trade deficit within 
manageable limits. 
 
Privatization was another important change in the macro economy, for Mexico 
had a very large and inefficient state-owned sector engaged in steel, fertilizers, hotels, 
banks, insurance, telephones, and many stakes in manufacturing industry. From all of 
these industries, the state withdrew. Privatization was a sound policy, as it reduced the 
size of the state and budgetary transfers. But clearly one problem was that many 
privatizations during the term of Salinas lacked transparency and ended up in 
bankruptcies after the peso devaluation in 1995. 
 
New privatization projects are now focused on electricity, gas, and a new regime 
for toll roads. President Vicente Fox, however, with the bad experience of the 1990s and 
especially because of the high cost of rescuing the banks that had been privatized, must 
assure the Congress and public opinion that they will not repeat past mistakes and vices 
before obtaining broad support for privatizations.  
 
Foreign direct investment 
 
Table I above shows that FDI has jumped after the NAFTA, which has led to major 
changes in ownership across sectors, transforming Mexican companies into more 
efficiently run firms and changing the way in which management operates. FDI was an 
average of $4.6 billion per year during 1989-94, almost trebled to $11.8 billion during 
1996-2000, and reached a peak of $27.7 billion in 2001. 
 
Apart from the greater flows of capital and technology, FDI has led to qualitative 
improvements in corporate governance, an area until recently ignored by Mexican  10
regulators. That is, for the first time regulations were issued in 2001 establishing rules for 
the conduct of boards of directors and for the protection of minority rights.
14  
 
The NAFTA has been instrumental in making Mexico more attractive and secure 
for foreign investors, especially because they know that the free trade regime is 
permanent, therefore removing a possible cause for uncertainty. It also amplified the size 
of the potential market to investors operating in any of the three countries. 
 
The NAFTA contained a precept guaranteeing national treatment status to any 
investor from the region investing in any of the three countries. Moreover, in practice it 
helped create a climate more propitious to relaxing restrictions, as foreign investment was 
more notorious across economic activities and the public gradually saw in this an 
opportunity for more jobs and higher incomes. In 1995, the first foreign banks were 
permitted to increase their equity shares in Mexican banks to acquire control, and gas 
distribution was open to private investors. Later on most of the banks were acquired by 
foreign investors. 
The positive effects of FDI have become clear across sectors of activity. 
Modernization of management and work standards has been visible in all banks acquired 
by foreigners. The contribution of foreign partners to modernize management of family-
owned businesses has also been substantial. In many of the largest public firms, 
professional managers are now more prominent than they were in the early 1990s, while 
boards of directors are much more active. Investors, for their part, demand greater 
information on the companies’ operations.  
 
Under NAFTA foreign capital flows to Mexico have revitalized older sectors and 
created new ones.  Foreign investment has contributed to the establishment of state-of-
the-art plants that are internationally competitive. Three industrial sectors that stand out -- 
automobiles, electronics and textiles, which represent core sectors from traditional, heavy 
and high technology industries -- have become more dynamic and competitive since the 
agreement became effective in 1994.   
 
Other sectors that have not enjoyed the same kind of capital inflows have not 
enjoyed the same kind of success. For example, Mexico’s agriculture sector has shown 
mixed results under NAFTA.  A dynamic export-oriented agribusiness sector coexists 
with a traditional self-subsistence agriculture sector.  The uneven performance of 
agriculture reveals what NAFTA really is -- an agreement to reduce tariff barriers and 
promote trade and investment flows -- and the limits to what it can deliver.  NAFTA is 
only an instrument that creates opportunities for growth in certain economic sectors, not a 
solution for transforming the entire economy. 
 
Labor markets 
 
The NAFTA caused an increase in industrial and services employment, offsetting losses 
of jobs in farming. In those sectors where employment has increased, output has 
                                                           
14 “Ley del Mercado de Valores,” Diario Oficial de la Federación, June 1,  2001.  11
increased at a faster rate, so that productivity is considerably higher than it was before the 
NAFTA. This explains that there has been a steady increase in real wages, which 
continue to catch up with higher levels of wages in North America.  
 
Nevertheless, wages have increased from very low levels after major macro crises 
wiped out almost one half of their purchasing power in the early 1980s. In the more 
recent period of 1998 to 2001, wages have shown a steady upward trend despite 
fluctuations in output and employment.
15  
 
Labor productivity in the manufacturing industry, measured crudely as the ratio of 
output to employment, grew 38 percent during the 1980s up until 1990, that is, by 3.3 
percent per year.  From 1990 to 1993, this growth accelerated to 6.4 percent and from 
that year to 2001 it slowed down to 4.8 percent.
16   
 
The NAFTA has been a major catalyst of the increase in productivity, which has 
been highly correlated with exports.
17 (But even with such growth in productivity, labor 
markets in Mexico are still much less flexible than in North America. Workers continue 
to enjoy heavy protection against shedding or relocation; collective labor contracts 
contain a myriad of uneconomic conditions for companies; and measures to reduce 
employment are in practice extremely difficult to implement. In 2001, the combination of 
the U.S. recession and a strong peso exchange rate led some multinational firms in 
manufacturing to close down operations for the first time in many years, blaming high 
labor costs.
18 In fact, this is one cause for the fall in manufacturing employment of -3.9 
last year. 
 
Sectoral developments of NAFTA 
 
Table II shows the dramatic increase in exports from Mexico, from $41 billion in 1990 to 
$51.9 billion in 1993 (8.1 percent per year) and $166.4 billion in 2000 (15 percent per 
year from 1990 and 18.1 percent from 1993). On this measure, the post-NAFTA period 
recorded most of the growth in exports. 
 
 
 
                                                           
15 Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografía e Informática (INEGI), various years, various statistics, 
at htpp://www.inegi.gob.mx/ 
16 Rogelio Ramírez De la O., What Has Changed in the Performance of Employment and Wages in 
Mexico after NAFTA?  Incomes and Productivity in North America (Papers from the 2000 Seminar of the 
Commission for Labor Cooperation, 2000) 
17 Ramírez De la O.,Rogelio,  “The Impact  of NAFTA in the Auto Industry in México”  in The North 
American Auto Industry under NAFTA, Sidney Weintraub and Christopher Sands eds. (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies,  1998).  
18 Luhnow 2002.  12
 
 
Table III shows that imports recorded a similarly high increase, so that the link between 
export and import growth became accentuated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1990 1993 2000
Exports 41,046 51,886 166,424
    Crude Oil 8,921 6,485 14,884
    Manufactures 29,062 42,500 146,439
Textiles 1,291 2,770 12,512
Chemicals 1,830 2,558 5,971
Glass 258 673 1,561
Steel 938 1,399 2,983
Transport Equipment 12,876 14,514 51,143
Electrical, Electronics 7,022 14,032 49,156
Source: Bank of Mexico, 'Indicadores del Sector Externo', various years
Table II
Total Exports of Mexico and selected manufactures
($ Million)
1990 1993 2000
Imports 41,579 65,367 174,480
    Agriculture 2,265 2,393 4,855
    Manufactures 28,341 61,568 165,221
Textiles 1,706 3,525 10,035
Chemicals 2,929 4,855 11,425
Plastics 785 3,404 9,277
Steel 1,628 3,312 7,653
Transport equipment 13,821 16,770 44,497
Electrical, electronics 7,265 12,511 44,744
Source: Bank of Mexico, "Indicadores del Sector Externo', various years
Table III
Total Imports of Mexico and selected products
($ Million) 13
 
The auto sector 
 
The auto sector has been the most dynamic sector in the NAFTA. Mexico’s exports, in 
the table, included as transport equipment, jumped from $12.8 billion in 1990 to $14.5 
billion in 1993 and $51.1 billion in 2000. Mexico’s export drive started before the 
NAFTA, but it did not go for enough as after the NAFTA.   
 
The automotive industry plays a crucial role in the economies of Mexico, Canada 
and the United States in terms of exports, employment generation, and technological and 
industrial development. The sector is not only the largest exporter and importer of 
manufactured goods. Thus it is not surprising that the automotive sector was singled out 
as particularly sensitive during NAFTA negotiations. From the Mexican perspective it is 
also a prime example of the kind of intra industry trade NAFTA was designed to boost. 
Free trade allows firms that sell in the entire North American market to relocate their 
production facilities among NAFTA countries to minimize costs and take full advantage 
of specialization and economies of scale.   
 
The auto industry in Mexico has taken full advantage of trade and investment 
policies established under NAFTA.
19   It has gone through a restructuring process that has 
enabled it to increase competitiveness and to successfully integrate into the North 
American and the world auto market. 
 
The automotive industry has contributed to growth and job creation. Although the 
1995 peso crisis had a devastating effect on Mexican auto production with domestic sales 
falling 80 percent, NAFTA made it possible for the industry to recover with remarkable 
speed.  Vehicle and auto parts production represents 2 percent of Mexico’s GDP and 
more than 11 percent of Mexico’s manufacturing GDP. The auto industry accounts for 20 
percent of Mexico’s total exports and 22 percent of total manufacture exports.  
 
Production jumped from 1.055 million units of cars and trucks in 1993 to 1.854 
million in 2001, an annual growth of 7.3 percent. Exports were 493,194 and 1.382 
million respectively, i.e. a growth of 13.8 percent per year. Domestic sales of vehicles 
jumped from 576,025 to 918,835 units, growing 6 percent per year despite the deep 
recession in 1995 when sales plummeted -69 percent followed by only a mild recovery. 
 
Employment in manufacturing in the auto industry reached 313,157 workers in 
1993, rising to 432,733 in 2001, i.e. by 4.1 percent per year. Comparing this figure with 
that of output growth, we can infer that there was an annual increase in productivity per 
worker of 3.1 percent per year. While employment in vehicle producers only rose mildly 
from 1993 to 2001, employment in auto parts increased by 4.8 percent per year, 
significantly higher than the increase of 2.6 percent per year recorded for the whole 
manufacturing sector, as was shown in Table I. 
                                                           
19 NAFTA provisions were  fully implemented this year and  the specific levels of local content and 
export requirements for manufacturers of autos in Mexico, and the conditions for importing foreign 
vehicles based on sales in the Mexican market as provided in the 1989 Auto Decree were eliminated.  14
Under NAFTA the Mexican auto industry has become highly integrated with its 
Canadian and U.S. counterparts, and vehicles made in Mexico have a high United States 
and Canadian content. Trade in automotive products has consequently exploded. U.S.-
Mexico trade in vehicles and auto parts expanded from $14.6 billion to $47.1 billion 
between 1993 and 2000. Almost 25 percent of U.S. auto parts imports come from 
Mexico. 
20 
  Around 90 percent of Mexico’s vehicle exports are sold in the U.S. market, 6 
percent in Canada, and 3 percent in Germany.  Mexico has become the second largest 
export market, after Canada, for both U.S. vehicles and auto parts. In 2000, U.S. car 
exports to Mexico totaled  $4.3 billion. 
 
Mexico, largely as a result of the NAFTA, is now the eighth largest global 
producer of cars and fifth in trucks. The good performance of the industry makes it key 
for future integration with North America. Moreover, the government is keen to create 
conditions to attract more FDI and is in close consultation with the industry regarding 
taxes and other factors that affect costs and prices. In the next few years we will see 
greater commitments by the government to facilitate expansion and productivity growth 
in this industry. 
 
The textile and clothing industry 
 
A major goal for Mexico in the NAFTA negotiation was to gain improved access to the 
U.S. market for its textile and clothing products through full elimination of tariffs and 
Multilateral Fiber Agreement (MFA) quotas.   Prior to NAFTA, the so-called Special 
Regime enabled Mexican apparel assembled from U.S. fabric to benefit from flexible 
quotas and the application of U.S. tariffs only on the non-U.S. value added (in other 
words, “round trip” U.S. fabric was free from duty).  Intensive utilization of the Special 
Regime by Mexican exporters established the basis for a fast growing garment industry 
and jobs for low skilled workers.  Under NAFTA, immediate elimination of MFA quotas, 
coupled with substantial cuts on exceptionally high tariffs as NAFTA entered into force, 
extended the gains achieved under the Special Regime.  Benefits were also extended to 
Mexican fabric producers, who became qualifying suppliers under the complex NAFTA 
rules of origin 
21    
 
  After almost a decade under NAFTA, performance of the Mexican textile and 
clothing industry bears out the initial expectations. In 1995, the Mexican industry 
suffered from the collapse of the domestic economy.  Like the auto industry, it was able 
                                                           
 
     20 Among the main auto parts that the United States buys from Mexico are wire harnesses, auto stereos, 
auto body parts, speedometers, engines and air conditioning parts. For its part, Mexico buys from the 
United States engines, wheels, seat parts, and auto stereos. A similar type of integration has occurred 
between the Mexican and Canadian automotive sectors. 
 
21  NAFTA stipulates that no new quotas in the textile and clothing sector may be imposed except 
under specific safeguard provisions.  Moreover,  some products that do not meet the NAFTA rules of origin 
may still qualify for preferential treatment up to a “tariff preference level,” or up to a specified import level, 
which is negotiated among the three countries (Hufbauer and Schott 1993).  15
to export its way to recovery thanks to preferential market access. After a sharp 6 percent 
decline in 1995, the industry grew 15 percent, 10 percent, and 5 percent in 1996, 1997, 
and 1998, respectively.   
 
  In 2000, Mexico’s textile and clothing industry exported $11 billion, contributing 
more than 6.5 percent of Mexico’s total exports.  Two-way Mexico-U.S. trade in textiles 
and clothing increased from $4.1 billion in 1993 to $15.3 billion in 2000.
22 In 1998, 
Mexico became the leading supplier of textile and clothing products to the United States, 
displacing China. 
23 
  Significantly, Mexico has also become the largest market for U.S. 
textile products 
24   Today Mexico’s textile and clothing industry includes almost 1,200 
maquiladora plants, employing close to 286,000 workers. 
 
The electronics industry 
 
The electronics industry, in a fashion similar to the automotive and textile/clothing 
sectors, became a major export player for Mexico as a result of trade and investment 
opening promoted by the NAFTA.  Mexico established itself as the main trading partner 
for the United States in electronics, surpassing such key players as Japan, Canada, 
Taiwan, Korea and Singapore.  In 2000, both Mexican exports of electronics to the 
United States and U.S. exports to Mexico amounted to about $34 billion in each 
direction.  Electronics trade between Mexico and Canada rose from $210 million in 1993 
to $773 million in 2000.  Zero tariffs and a stable investment climate are behind these 
trade statistics. 
 
NAFTA has encouraged Mexican production of sophisticated electronic products 
that go beyond mere assembly, with significant research and development now conducted 
in Mexico.
25 The 1970s stereotype of low cost, labor intensive assembly no longer 
characterizes the new generation of electronics production.
26  
 
Some 570 maquiladora plants now operate in the electrical and electronics 
sectors, representing almost 12 percent of the total number of maquiladora plants in 
Mexico. In 2000, these firms employed approximately 350,000 workers, an increase of 
80 percent over 1993 levels. 
                                                           
22 Sistema de Informacion Empresarial Mexicano, NAFTA Works: For the Textiles and Apparel 
Industry. Sectoral Fact Sheet (2000) available at 
htpp//www.naftaworks.org/Publications/Industrial/industrial.html. 
23 Mexico’s main textile and clothing exports to the United States are denim products, knit fabric, 
synthetic fabric, trousers, T-shirts, sweaters and underwear. 
24 Approximately 75 percent of Mexico’s clothing production incorporates U.S. fabric. Kurt Salmon 
Associates Capital Advisors, “Textile Transactions and Trends: Perspectives on Mergers and Acquisitions,” 
Textile Industry Newsletter (Summer, 1999). 
25 Jorge Carrillo  and  Alfredo Hualde, “Third Generation In-Bond Assembly Plants. The Case of 
Delphi-General Motors,” Comercio Exterior 47 no. 9 (1997): 747-58. 
26 Nichola Lowe and Martin Kenney, “Foreign Investment and Global Geography of Production: Why 
the Mexican Consumer Electronics Industry Failed,” World Development 27, no. 8 (1999): 1427-43.   16
  The trade and investment story for electronics, as for autos and textiles and 
clothing, finds firms repositioning themselves through mergers, acquisitions and 
greenfield investments, and restructuring their chains of supply. The result is far deeper 
integration of the North American economies. The reward has been higher productivity in 
favored sectors, a strengthened position in the world economy, and booming intra-
industry trade. 
 
The agriculture sector 
 
Unlike the manufacturing sector, however, NAFTA has had very different effects over a 
two-tier agriculture sector where a booming agribusiness sector coexists with a self 
subsistence, backward and traditional sector.  While the first has been able to increase its 
exports as a result of improved market access into the United States and Canada, the 
latter has been unable to take advantage of the benefits that NAFTA has provided in 
terms of investment and increased production. 
 
Agriculture accounts for less than 5 percent of Mexico-U.S. trade. While trade in 
this sector has grown, export dynamism is concentrated among fruit and vegetable 
producers in northern and western Mexico who have access to credit and have 
traditionally been quite competitive. These producers do not engage in traditional 
Mexican subsistence agriculture, which is heavily concentrated in the central and 
southern parts of Mexico. The dichotomy between subsistence ejido-type production and 
export-led agriculture pushed the government to introduce a variety of domestic support 
policies that side-step NAFTA to sustain the livelihood of Mexican peasantry. 
27  
 
 
Regional effects of NAFTA 
 
Exports and investment have been the leading forces of growth in Mexico for the past 
five years. Both of them are closely linked to the NAFTA, but for the same reason their 
effects have been uneven across regions. 
 
The main driver for exports and manufacturing activity has been the northern 
region and especially the border. South of the border, the industrial area north of Mexico 
City, Guadalajara, Monterrey, and Aguascalientes have all seen growth in industrial 
activity and in exports. These regions are all located in the northern corridor from the 
center of Mexico to the north east and in the western region of Guadalajara, where 
foreign firms in electronics have proliferated for the past years. 
 
  But regional disparities have increased after the NAFTA, for the south of Mexico 
has not attracted as much activity as the north. This problem has been aggravated by 
budget constraints, preventing the Government from investing in infrastructure and social 
services. Lack of opportunities in the south while there are growing exports and activity 
                                                           
27 This is the case of the Program for Direct Support for Mexican Producers which delivers cash 
payments  to guarantee a minimum income for 2.9 million farmers who sow 14 million hectares of basic 
crops.  17
in the north, results in large flows of migrants from southern states to the northern border 
and eventually illegally into the United States. 
 
The relatively high growth in the north has added pressure on public infrastructure 
and social services, leading in some instances, to extremely poor environmental 
conditions, lack of water, and other public services in northern cities. With this in mind, 
President Fox’s government announced an ambitious plan (Plan Puebla-Panama) to 
invest in infrastructure and connect Mexico with Central America through more roads, 
telecommunications and seaports. This plan, however, depends entirely on the successful 
integration of Mexico to North America. But can successful integration with North 
America be maintained and enhanced in light of recent events in the United States and 
particularly the attacks of September 11
th? 
 
The “Grand Bargain” 
 
As we mentioned before, NAFTA’s success in achieving the aims for which it was 
negotiated, led some academics and public officials including president Fox himself, to 
propose in early 2001 that North America should advance towards deeper levels of 
integration very much in the European style. The proposal was bold to the extent that it 
did not argue in favor of what in classic integration theory would be considered a natural 
second or third steps, namely,  a customs union or a common market but it went even 
further to propose a North American Community or  “grand Bargain”. The main idea of 
the “Grand Bargain” was that NAFTA had achieved everything that could be 
accomplished through a process of free trade in goods and investment and what was 
required next was the liberalization of labor flows and a recognition that  the more 
developed economies, i.e., the United States and Canada,  have a responsibility to   
provide financial support to the less developed economy, namely,  Mexico to tackle some 
of the problems that NAFTA had accelerated like the regional polarization of the 
economy or the lack of infrastructure in the southern states of Mexico and infra-structural 
decay  in the northern border.   
 
This proposal, to say the least, was received with skepticism in Canada and the 
United States but in the latter country the government of President Bush decided to 
initiate talks to explore new ways to strengthen the U.S-Mexican economic and migratory 
relationship. According to some observers and participants in the negotiations, the talks 
basically were centering in a possible migratory agreement through which an important 
amount of Mexican workers would be allowed to come temporarily to work in the United 
States. Mexico in turn was insisting that the agreement should also include provisions to 
legalize the 3 to 4 million of Mexican undocumented workers that are residing in the U.S. 
This Mexican proposal was made famous by the Mexican Foreign Relations Minister, 
Jorge Castañeda as “the whole Enchilada approach.” Apparently, the Bush administration 
was not persuaded of the legalization proposal but had not rejected it either. But then 
came September 11
th.  What has been the impact of the September 11
th attacks on the 
Mexican-U.S. relations? In the next section, I discuss the significance of the September 
11
th attacks for the future of Mexico-U.S. economic relations. 
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September 11
th and the need for secure but open borders 
 
History shows that stunning events can force a new perception of the world and a new set 
of policies. In 1941, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor forced the American public to follow 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s lead, abandon the entrenched post First World War policy 
of isolationism, and adopt a new policy of active engagement in world turmoil. In 2003, 
the tragic events of September 11
th are still being debated in the United States.  President 
George W. Bush has called for a global war on terrorism based on a new doctrine of 
preemptive strikes and the creation of a new Department of Homeland Security with 
extensive powers.  How these initiatives will play out remains to be seen.  But the same 
openness that fosters economic integration is evidently a great source of vulnerability. 
The United States has thus begun to adopt an array of new policies to make its domestic 
territory and its borders more secure. 
 
For Canada and Mexico the new security policies had immediate and shocking 
implications.  On September 11, 2001, the U.S. authorities took a number of immediate 
measures at its borders north and south.  U.S. Customs went to a high level of alert which 
still exists (Level One: sustained and intense inspection).  Automobile traffic was delayed 
for several hours and commercial traffic for up to 12 to 15 hours for several days 
thereafter. Just-in-time manufacturers, particularly auto companies and Mexican goods 
exporters, were in crisis.  By some estimates, unexpected shutdowns due to part shortages 
cost auto makers up to $25,000 a minute in lost production.  Cross-border retail shopping 
and tourism plunged.    The U.S. Customs Service beefed up its staffing along the border 
and introduced legislation to triple the number of agents.  The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) announced plans to introduce an entry/exit system by 2003 
at airports and seaports and by 2004 at the 50 largest land entry points.  This system 
would require visitors, including those from Mexico, to have their names recorded every 
time they enter and leave the country.   
 
As these measures were adopted, Mexico’s choices seemed to narrow: either take 
a leap towards deeper integration and be “inside the U.S. tent” or see the bilateral border 
re-erected and be left outside. Debates about deeper integration predated September 11
th 
as did work to negotiate a new initiative to allow more Mexican migrant workers into the 
United States and legalize the workers already living in the United States, but the range 
of possibilities changed that day. Deeper integration became a matter of national security: 
if Mexico wanted to preserve openness it had to pay more attention to security. 
 
Longer term, the impact of a permanent increase in border transaction costs acts 
like a tariff, particularly on Mexican and Canadian goods entering the United States.  The 
higher cost of exports causes U.S. customers to switch to cheaper domestic and 
alternative foreign suppliers.  Mexico’s exchange rate depreciates as the demand for 
Mexican pesos declines. More expensive imports undermine Mexican living standards. 
Higher costs of moving people, goods and services also erode Mexico’s productivity 
performance. The other longer term impact could be the reconsideration of the plans to 
invest in Mexico by countries like Japan and those in the EU. Increasingly, they can be 
expected to head for the United States with new investments. Why invest in Mexico or  19
Canada if border delays are to be a permanent factor in the other North American 
markets? Diversion of such investment would also undermine Mexico’s productivity 
growth.   
 
Mexico is not alone in its dilemma. Increased border security raises transaction 
costs around the world. Some estimates put the aggregate increase in transaction costs at 
one to two percentage points.  If these costs become permanent, some way will have to be 
found to offset the increase -- for example by negotiating in the WTO or the Free Trade 
Area of the of Americas an across-the-board reduction in industrial tariffs of an 
equivalent or greater amount. 
 
Mexico’s response, after a period of uncertainty and delay, was to negotiate with the 
United States a Border Partnership Action Plan recently announced by the two 
countries.
28  This accord is similar to the one signed in December 2001 by the United 
States and Canada on Smart Borders.  
 
The Action Plan aimed to achieve three objectives: to secure infrastructure, to secure 
the flows of people and to secure the flows of goods.  The securing of infrastructure will 
aim to:  
…conduct a joint survey of …[the]… border to identify bottlenecks that 
impedes the movement of goods and people…to develop integrated 
infrastructure investment plans…and to conduct security assessments of 
critical infrastructure and take steps to protect them from terrorist 
attacks.
29   
 
The securing of the flows of people, in its turn, will aim to: 
 
 …develop and implement technology systems at ports of entry to speed 
the flow of bona-fide travelers; to cooperate to identify individuals who 
pose threats to....[both]  societies before they arrive in North America and 
to coordinate efforts to deter smuggling of third-country nationals and 
establish a joint U.S. Mexico Advanced Passenger Information Exchange 
System.
30  
Finally, the securing of the flow of goods aims to:  
 
…implement technology-sharing programs to place non-intrusive 
inspection systems on cross-border rail lines and high-volume ports of 
entry; develop and implement technology systems to increase security at 
                                                           
28 U.S. Department of State- Office of the Secretary, “Smart Border: 22 Point Agreement-U.S. Mexico 
Border Partnership Action Plan,” Fact Sheet (2002) (http:// www.state.gob/p/wha/rls/fs/8909.htm). 
29 U.S. Department of State-Office of the Secretary, “Specific Measures that Compromise Joint Action 
Plan with Mexico”, Fact Sheet (2002), (http:// www.state.gob/p/wha/rls/fs/8910.htm). 
30 Ibid.  20
all points of the supply chain that links producers and consumers and to 
expand partnerships with the private sector to increase security of 
commercial shipments.
31  
 
In other words, all these measures aim to “move the border away from the border” 
through fast tracking pre-cleared travelers at border points; integrated border enforcement 
teams staffed by the two countries with common objectives and integrated actions; 
Internet-based measures to simplify border transactions for small and medium sized 
enterprises; and infrastructure investment to improve access to border crossings through, 
for example, new highway bypasses that avoid congested downtown streets, along with a 
smart handling of goods and people at crossings.  These are all sensible measures to 
secure an open border for goods and services.   
 
But there are a number of sensitive measures that relate to the movement of 
people that still are undefined. Many measures will speed the cross-border movement of 
business travelers. Even permanent resident cards are contemplated, including a 
biometric identifier. These measures, also, will undoubtedly increase confidence that 
people from third countries coming to North America do not have malign intentions.  But 
what is not clear from the border plan is the treatment to be given to Mexican migrant 
workers. Within this category there are, as we know, two groups: those who already 
reside in the United States, a group whose number reached between 3 and 4.5 million in 
the last decade;
32 and those who will, in the future, come to the United States to work. All 
that was mentioned when the Action Plan was announced by presidents Fox and Bush in 
Monterrey, Mexico, was that the Cabinet level migration group should continue 
negotiating this issue the way it was charged with in previous meetings between both 
presidents in Guanajuato and Washington.
33 In these meetings both presidents committed 
to a “ Grand Bargain” in immigration flows from Mexico, that is a search for alternatives 
to legalize or regularize the migrants who already reside in the United States and adopt a 
more liberal approach for those who will, in the future, come to the United States to 
work.  
 
The question, however, is whether the “Grand Bargain” approach is still a viable 
initiative after the September 11
th events. For Mexico, no doubt, immigration is an issue 
that has to form part of the Border Partnership Action Plan.  The Mexican government 
considers the legalization of immigrant workers a matter of human rights and social 
justice -- and a necessary step in the economic integration of North America.  In terms of 
economic benefits, legalization will help ensure that the Mexican economy receives a 
growing flow of worker remittances, which now run about $13 billion a year (U.S-
Mexico Migration Panel 2001). The legalization of millions of Mexicans working in the 
                                                           
31 Ibid. 
32 Robert Pastor, op. cit.; Steven A.  Camarota,  Immigration from Mexico: Assessing the Impact on the 
United States  (Washington DC: Center for Immigration Studies, 2001). 
33  Presidents Bush and Fox Announcement of Border Partnership Program. 2002. 
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United States will moreover improve their economic prospects and enable many to return 
to Mexico as successful entrepreneurs.   
 
On the U.S. side, feelings are equally strong.  Some Americans flat out oppose 
any increase in immigration.  More immediately, the attack on September 11
th and the 
subsequent deterioration of the U.S. economy damped discussions of a “Grand Bargain” 
that started in the Administration and Congress in the fall of 2001.  The fact that many of 
the terrorists overstayed their visas cast a huge shadow over any legalization initiative. 
34 
 
The recession and rising unemployment gave fresh impetus to groups that oppose the 
opening of the border to migrant workers. According to polls,  taken after September 11
th 
the American people grew more apprehensive about what they perceive as weak border 
control and voiced stronger support for enforcing immigration laws. 
35 
  
 
What does this imply for a Grand Bargain on undocumented immigration and the 
concept of a Border Partnership Action Plan? In my opinion, the shifting political 
landscape in the United States has superimposed security concerns on top of the already 
difficult economic issues wrapped up in immigration policy.  Any deal on immigration 
will need to enhance the security climate by comparison with the current regime.  
 
What kind of assurances could an immigration agreement provide that both 
satisfies security concerns and facilitates the creation of a secure border?  The place to 
start is with the ongoing flow of migrant workers arriving in the United States.  When the 
current recession gives way to a stronger economy, the United States should take up 
Fox’s challenge, put forward shortly before the September 11
th attacks, to substantially 
enlarge the annual quota of Mexicans legally authorized to enter the United States on 
temporary (but renewable) work permits.  In recent years, legal immigration from Mexico 
to the United States has numbered about 130,000 to 170,000 persons annually (U.S. 
Department of Justice 2002).
 Illegal immigration numbers are of course speculative, but 
the INS places the annual average at about 150,000 between 1988 and 1996 (U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Service 2001).
36 
  
 
In my opinion, the way to tackle the flow problem is to start with an expanded 
number of legal visas, say 300,000 persons from Mexico annually. Additional visas 
should be issued on a work skill basis (including unskilled workers), not on a family 
reunification basis (the dominant test for current visas).  However -- and this is where 
security is underlined -- to obtain a temporary work permit, the Mexican applicant will 
                                                           
34 According to some analysts, September 11 shifted the immigration discussion from legalizing illegal 
migrants towards cracking down on them.  Ronald Brownstein, The American Prospect (November, 21 
2001): 31. 
35 In a national poll conducted after September 11 by John Zogby for the Center for Immigration 
Studies in Washington, D.C., some three-fourths of Americans said that the government wasn’t doing 
enough to control the border, and nearly as many said that it should greatly increase the resources devoted 
to enforcing immigration laws.  See Brownstein.  
36 Camarota estimates that total legal and illegal immigration from Mexico averaged about 400,000 
annually between 1998 and 2000.  By implication, his figures suggest that illegal immigration was running 
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have to undergo a background check designed to avert security threats.  Once inside the 
United States, temporary permit holders would need periodically to inform the INS 
electronically of their address and place of employment.  Permit holders could renew 
their permits as long as they were employed a certain number of months (say eight 
months) in each rolling twelve-month period, had no felony convictions, and reported 
regularly to the INS.  They could apply for U.S. citizenship after a certain number of 
years (say a cumulative five years as temporary permit holders).  In the meantime, they 
should accumulate public Social Security and Medicare rights, as well as any private 
health or pension benefits.   
 
Coupled with this substantial, but closely regulated, increase in temporary work 
permits, the United States and Mexico should embark on a joint border patrol program to 
reduce the flow of illegal crossings.  The program should include features such as 
enhanced use of electronic surveillance, ineligibility for a temporary work permit for 
three years after an illegal crossing, and short-term misdemeanor detention (say 30 days) 
in Mexico following an illegal crossing.  No border patrol program will eliminate illegal 
crossings, but a joint program, coupled with a substantial temporary work permit 
initiative, could reduce the flow.   
 
That leaves the very difficult question of perhaps 4 million undocumented 
Mexicans living and working in the United States. There is no magic solution. The 
foundation for my tentative suggestions is the proposition that nearly all these people 
have made permanent homes in the United States and they are not going to pick up their 
lives and return to Mexico. Under a set of appropriate circumstances, therefore, they 
should be granted residence permits with eligibility for citizenship. The appropriate 
circumstances I envisage have two components -- a threshold relating to illegal crossings 
and standards for individual applicants. 
 
•  The resident permit program would be launched when the Presidents of the 
United States and Mexico could jointly certify that the annual rate of illegal 
crossings does not exceed 50,000 persons.  This would entail a reduction of more 
than two-thirds in illegal crossings estimated in recent years.  The resident permit 
program would be suspended in years when the Presidents could not make this 
certification. 
 
•  Individual eligibility would require evidence that the person resided in the United 
States prior to the announcement of the program.  Otherwise, eligibility standards 
would parallel those for temporary work permits discussed earlier.  
 
•  An applicant for a residence permit who could provide satisfactory evidence of 
residence in the United States prior to the announcement of the program would 
not be subject to deportation (whether or not he met other eligibility requirements) 
so long as he periodically reported a place of residence to the INS and committed 
no felony after the issuance of the residence permit. 
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•  Holders of residence permits would be immediately eligible for public Social 
Security and Medicare benefits, as well as private health and pension benefits.  
They could apply for citizenship say after seven years. 
 
 